Politics at the Cutting Edge: Intergovernmental Policy Innovation in the Affordable Care Act by Rocco, Philip B. et al.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Political Science Faculty Research and Publications Political Science, Department of
7-1-2018
Politics at the Cutting Edge: Intergovernmental




California State University - East Bay
Ann C. Keller
University of California - Berkeley
Accepted version. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 48, No, 3 ( July 1, 2018): 425–453. DOI.©





Political Science Faculty Research and Publications/College of Arts and 
Sciences 
 
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; but the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The 
published version may be accessed by following the link in the citation below. 
 
Journal of Federalism, Vol. 48, No. 3 (July 1, 2018): 425-453. DOI. This article is © Oxford University 
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford 
University Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from Oxford University Press.  
Contents 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................................2 
The Affordable Care Act and the Politics of Intergovernmental Innovation ..............................................................3 
The SIM Initiative: A Low-Salience, Bureaucratic Policy Arena ..................................................................................5 
Data and Methods ......................................................................................................................................................6 
Results ........................................................................................................................................................................9 
Arkansas: Payers and Partnerships ..................................................................................................................... 11 
Maine: Government-Led Reform in an anti-Obamacare State ........................................................................... 13 
Oregon: Building on a State Policy Legacy .......................................................................................................... 15 
Discussion ................................................................................................................................................................ 16 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................... 18 
Footnotes................................................................................................................................................................. 19 
References ............................................................................................................................................................... 19 
 
Politics at the Cutting Edge: 
Intergovernmental Policy Innovation in the 
Affordable Care Act 
 
Philip Rocco 
Political Science Department, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 
Andrew S. Kelly 
California State University, East Bay 
Ann C. Keller 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Abstract 
In the eight years since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), state governments 
have remained critical sites of contention over the law. Intense partisan conflict over ACA implementation has 
raised questions about traditional theories of intergovernmental relations, which posit that federal–state 
cooperation depends largely on policy design. Yet, few studies have examined how partisanship, as well as other 
important factors, shape state policy innovations under the ACA. This article examines the ACA’s State 
Innovation Models (SIM) initiative. SIM is specifically geared towards incentivizing states to experiment with 
new models of payment and delivery that can improve health outcomes and/or reduce health-care costs. 
Drawing on a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence, we find that states’ participation in SIM is 
shaped by partisanship, administrative capacity, and state policy legacies. Our findings have implications for 
future efforts at intergovernmental health reforms. 
Whatever else the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) may be, it is a window onto 
intergovernmental relations in a polarized age. Eight years after the law’s passage, states’ choices about 
whether, and how, to implement its provisions––from Medicaid expansion to insurance market regulations––
are shot through with partisan conflict. Under the Obama administration, such conflicts took on a familiar form, 
with Republican governors and state legislators proudly announcing their opposition to “Obamacare,” refusing 
to create insurance exchanges and accept funds for Medicaid expansion. These events have raised important 
questions about the applicability of traditional theories of intergovernmental relations, which posit that federal-
state cooperation depends in large part on policy design. (Gormley 2006; Bulman-Pozen and Metzger 
2016; Weissert and Uttermark 2017; Kincaid 2018). 
Yet, while state-level partisanship has constituted a barrier to ACA implementation, it remains an inadequate 
explanation of how states have chosen to participate in the ACA’s intergovernmental policy innovations. 
As Flagg (2016) notes, the ACA’s internal complexity allowed Republican governors to hold the party’s rhetorical 
line against “Obamacare” while quietly negotiating Medicaid expansion through Section 1115 waivers and 
implementing market reforms. A closer look at ACA implementation reveals the importance of non-partisan 
factors—including interest-group pressure, administrative capacity, and individual state policy legacies—at 
shaping state policy choices (Jones 2017; Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, and Lynch 2016; Haeder and Weimer 
2015; Callaghan and Jacobs 2014). 
As the configuration of party power that dominated the early years of ACA implementation begins to change, it 
is especially important to understand how factors other than party control of government shape state-level 
decision-making. Making sense of state policy choices under the ACA also requires attention to contextual 
factors (Béland, Rocco, and Waddan 2016). While partisan conflict over the ACA was intense overall, not all state 
policy choices under the ACA were equally politically salient. Furthermore, not all state policy choices required 
extensive action on the part of elected officials. And, as in the case of the ACA’s insurance-market reforms, some 
decisions were quite consistent with states’ pre-existing policy legacies. 
By focusing on state policy choices that are politically salient and require extensive action on the part of elected 
officials, existing scholarship has ignored programs within the law that focus specifically on encouraging 
state innovation. One such component of the Affordable Care Act was the creation of the Center for Medicare & 
Medicaid Innovation (CMMI). CMMI is housed within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and 
is charged with testing payment and delivery models that, ideally, will improve health outcomes while 
controlling costs. Though CMS supported state-level demonstration projects prior to the ACA’s passage, CMMI 
gave these efforts both a specific home within CMS and additional funding to encourage state efforts in 
payment and delivery reform. CMMI is pursuing innovation efforts by partnering directly with health providers 
to test reform models and by funding those states willing to lead reform efforts. The latter program is called 
State Innovation Models (SIM) and allows states to apply for “test” or “design” grants. Test grants allow states 
to implement a program of reforms, while the design grants provide support for states that are still in the 
planning phase for future reforms. An important feature of the SIM mechanism is that, unlike the providers who 
partner directly with CMMI to implement CMMI-selected reforms through the model test program, states can 
design their own reform efforts. Through this program, many states have cooperated with the federal 
government to design and implement payment and delivery system reforms designed to produce better health 
outcomes with greater efficiency. 
This article aims to understand the factors that shaped state participation in the SIM initiative. We begin by 
reviewing the literature on intergovernmental programs and policy innovation and providing some background 
on the SIM initiative. We then describe our data and methods, which include a quantitative analysis of state 
participation in the SIM initiative and in-depth case studies of participation by three states: Arkansas, Maine, 
and Oregon. Our quantitative results suggest that partisanship, state administrative capacity, and policy legacies 
structured state participation in significant ways. Further, the case studies reveal that key stakeholders from the 
healthcare sector supported state participation in the program, even in states where opposition to the ACA was 
otherwise robust. After discussing the findings and the limitations of the study, we conclude by considering its 
implications for the future of intergovernmental cooperation under the ACA. 
The Affordable Care Act and the Politics of Intergovernmental Innovation 
The passage of the ACA along partisan lines, and in the face of intense opposition from conservative advocacy 
groups and organized business, has led political scientists to re-examine the factors that affect state adoption of 
intergovernmental policy innovations—specifically, federal programs or policies supported by 
intergovernmental grant dollars or regulatory requirements. Classic models of federalism emphasize that state 
uptake of intergovernmental policy innovations is conditional on incentives and policy instrumentation (Derthick 
1970; Walker 2000; Posner 1998). As Gormley (2006) argues, states are more likely to engage in policy 
innovation when it is supported by federal grants, as long as the terms of the fiscal bargain are agreeable. 
Regulatory tools such as intergovernmental mandates, on the other hand, are more likely to elicit conflict and 
policy obstruction, as well as litigation. Yet, the implementation of the ACA casts doubt on these models. Béland, 
Rocco, and Waddan (2016) show that, whereas intergovernmental regulations elicited significant changes to 
consumer-protection laws, states left billions in federal grant dollars on the table by refusing to expand 
Medicaid and create state insurance exchanges. 
Scholars have pointed to the partisan control of state government as a key factor shaping the ACA’s anomalous 
pattern of intergovernmental policy innovation (Haeder and Weimer 2015; Rigby and Haselswerdt 2013; Krane 
and Noh 2018). Within the Republican Party, opposition to the ACA was intense, and state-level victories in the 
2010 midterm elections gave Republicans an important institutional foothold for opposing the ACA. As these 
studies correctly note, states with a Republican governor and state legislature were significantly less likely to 
implement state insurance exchanges than those states controlled by Democrats. Barrilleaux and Rainey 
(2014) found a strikingly similar partisan pattern when explaining governors’ decisions to oppose the expansion 
of Medicaid. 
Yet, while partisanship clearly matters, other scholars have suggested that the broad partisan pattern fails to 
adequately capture important nuances in state policy adoption. First, several studies have highlighted the 
importance of interest-group mobilization. Rose (2015) shows that pressure from hospital lobbyists pushed 
some Republican governors to accept federal funding for Medicaid expansion—despite strong intra-party 
pressure not to do so. Similarly, Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, and Lynch (2016) find that governors were more 
likely to support Medicaid expansion when prominent business associations and state chambers of commerce 
embraced this policy. In contrast, in states where conservative activists were strongly mobilized, governors were 
less likely to endorse Medicaid expansion (Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, and Lynch 2016; Jones 2017). 
Drawing on insights from historical institutionalism, several studies have also noted that states’ previous policy 
trajectories constrained their choices in the implementation of intergovernmental policy innovations under the 
ACA. States with prior legacies of expanding Medicaid eligibility were quicker to expand Medicaid under the 
ACA. This was true even in states with a Republican governor (e.g., Rick Snyder in Michigan and Chris Christie in 
New Jersey) (Callaghan and Jacobs 2014). Even Wisconsin, which formally refused to expand Medicaid, took 
advantage of federal funds and a pre-existing Section 1115 demonstration waiver to expand its existing 
BadgerCare program to a larger population (Flagg 2016). Pre-existing state institutions also shaped how states 
engaged in policy innovation. For example, in Ohio, Governor John Kasich (R) expanded Medicaid through an 
administrative board, allowing conservative state legislators to avoid casting a recorded vote on the issue (Flagg 
2016; Rose 2015). 
A fourth factor identified by prior studies was state administrative capacity. Jones (2017) suggests that states’ 
experience with ACA implementation depended on legislative professionalism. Importantly, because few states 
were in session directly after the ACA passed, outgoing Democratic governors had little ability to quickly 
entrench intergovernmental policy innovations prior to the end of their terms. Krane and Noh (2018) also show 
that states with greater administrative capacity implemented state insurance exchanges. Similarly, Callaghan 
and Jacobs (2014) find a moderate association between states’ bureaucratic capacity and the extent of state 
investment in Medicaid expansion. 
While most studies of ACA implementation focus on explaining variation in policy choices across the fifty 
states, Béland, Rocco, and Waddan (2016) note that this approach to understanding intergovernmental relations 
ignores important variation across programs. Indeed, as a complex policy made up of numerous reforms, 
understanding the ACA demands attending to “within case” variation. Hence, we might expect states’ 
participation in the ACA’s intergovernmental policy innovations to vary depending on the characteristics of the 
policy observed. For example, we might expect partisanship to account for variation in states’ adoption of 
intergovernmental programs when the political salience of a program is high (e.g., Medicaid expansion) or when 
decisions must be taken by elected officials in state legislatures (e.g., health-insurance exchanges) (Béland, 
Rocco, and Waddan 2016). In contrast, when programs exhibit low levels of political salience, or when state 
administrative agencies can accept federal funds without extensive interference from elected officials, we might 
expect other factors—such as interest-group mobilization, state institutional capacity, and policy legacies—to 
play a greater role in shaping state decisions. 
The SIM Initiative: A Low-Salience, Bureaucratic Policy Arena 
The ACA’s SIM initiative provides an ideal empirical setting to test how well hypotheses about 
intergovernmental policy innovation hold up in cases where political salience is low and where involvement 
from elected officials is more limited. Given that the federal government is the largest payer for health services 
in the country, federal policymakers have long been interested in policy innovations aimed at reducing cost or 
improving the quality of coverage. Prior to the creation of Medicaid, 1962 amendments to the Social Security 
Act gave the federal government the ability to approve state “experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects” 
under Section 1115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315). Within Medicaid, Section 1115 has enabled states to 
undertake innovations focused on a variety of patient populations, especially the long-term care population 
(Thompson and Burke 2007). 
Building on this legacy, Section 3021 of the Affordable Care Act consolidated federal authority for carrying out 
such demonstrations under Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI). In addition to appropriating 
$10 billion for policy innovations in the first decade of ACA implementation, Congress gave the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services greater discretion over designing and expanding demonstration projects without 
additional congressional approval, pending actuarial certification of savings or quality improvement (124 Stat. 
119, 389, 939 [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315a]). 
In 2012, CMMI invited state governments, with the support of the Governor’s office, to participate in 
cooperative agreements to design and test new approaches for improving the quality of healthcare through 
delivery or payment reforms. The animating idea behind the initiative is that states should be able to improve 
quality and reduce costs by leveraging their regulatory authority and policy expertise to act as “convener” for 
multi-payer initiatives and health system transformations oriented towards improving population health. First, 
states were encouraged to test out alternate forms of payment, specifically to move away from pure fee-for-
service arrangements between payers and providers. Second, states were encouraged to experiment with 
healthcare delivery reforms that might improve health outcomes (Van Vleet and Paradise 2014). 
The current trend in delivery reform is to set up care teams (e.g., health homes or patient centered medical 
homes) to improve continuity and care coordination. Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) essentially 
combine these two aims (delivery and payment reform) in that they are designed to provide team-based care 
for patients and shift some of the risks of the costs of care onto the provider organization or network. CMMI was 
particularly interested in proposals for ACOs, patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs) and bundled or episode-
based payment. Moreover, many states were already implementing some variant of these types of reforms 
before the passage of the ACA (Blewett, Spencer, and Huckfeldt 2017). Given the aims of the SIM grants, state 
innovation plans tend to focus on expanding the role of primary care and integrating healthcare across 
specialists, especially for at-risk populations with high healthcare costs. States, always under pressure to control 
Medicaid costs, had at least this incentive to test new payment models. Moreover, states that were 
underperforming in terms of healthcare outcomes faced additional pressures to consider reforms (Feder et al. 
2017; Van Vleet and Paradise 2014). 
States that had an operable state innovation plan could apply for “test” grants that would allow them to expand 
or deepen reform efforts and evaluate the outcomes of those efforts. States that did not have reform efforts 
underway could apply for grants to help them design reform efforts. In total, thirty-five states participated in at 
least one round of the SIM initiative. In the first round of the program, twenty-five states received nearly $300 
million dollars with six states receiving test grants and nineteen receiving awards that would help them design 
reform plans.1 In Round 2, the Innovation Center provided $660 million in grants with eleven states receiving 
test awards and twenty-one states/territories receiving design grants. As states implemented these plans, CMS 
provided technical assistance and opportunities for peer-to-peer learning. As the program was new, CMS also 
sought feedback from grantees about how well or poorly the program was being administered so that CMS 
could improve guidance and oversight in future rounds (RTI International 2014). 
The case of the SIM initiative raises an interesting analytical question in that, historically, payment reform has 
been a highly contentious area of health policymaking. Because the program does not force states to apply for 
SIM grants or pursue specific types of payment reform, one might argue that it is a benign piece of federal 
policy. Yet, past federal investments in research that merely had the potential to change health or public health 
practices––for example, the Patient Outcomes Research Teams funded as part of the Agency for Healthcare 
Policy and Research and the CDC’s program to fund research on the risks of firearm ownership––have met with 
ample resistance (Sorenson, Gusmano, and Collins 2014; Keller, 2014). As Feder et al. (2017) suggest, even when 
political leaders are sincerely interested in payment and delivery reform, they may lack the necessary statutory 
or administrative tools to accomplish these goals or may be unwilling to use the tools they possess. Thus, there 
are also reasons to believe that—despite the relatively low salience and technocratic natures of the SIM 
initiative—it may not have been less politically contentious than other features of the ACA. This study aims to 
shed light on how factors typically associated with intergovernmental policy innovation affected states’ 
participation in SIM. 
Data and Methods 
We employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection strategies to test hypotheses about 
state participation in the SIM initiative and to generate new insights into the factors that shape states’ decisions 
to apply for SIM grants. Both analyses evaluate leading explanations for state participation in intergovernmental 
policy innovations under the ACA. 
In our quantitative analysis, we model states’ decisions to apply for federal funds under the SIM initiative. Thus, 
rather than making distinctions between the “level” of state participation in SIM, we were simply interested in 
whether states chose to apply for any funding at all. To construct our dependent variable, we collected data 
from public websites on states that applied for model design and test awards during the 2012–2017 period 
(Toone 2014; CMMI 2017). Using these data, we constructed a binary variable indicating whether a state had 
applied for any funding at all during any stage of the SIM initiative. 
To tap into existing explanations for state participation in intergovernmental policy innovations, our model 
includes six independent variables (see summary statistics in table 1). First, to evaluate the state partisan control 
hypothesis, we included an additive four-point scale of Democratic control of state government at the beginning 
of the grant period (National Conference of State Legislatures 2012). We assign states 2 points for Democratic 
control of the governorship and one point for control of each house of the state legislature. States with unified 
Democratic government thus receive a score of 4 while states with unified Republican government are given a 
score of 0. The Republican Party’s opposition to the ACA in the years observed, we expect the relationship 
between Democratic control of state government and participation in the SIM initiative to be positive 
(e.g., Haeder and Weimer 2013; Krane and Noh 2018). 
Table 1. Summary statistics for all states in sample and case study states 
Chatacteristics  Mean (SD)  Oregon  Arkansas  Maine  
Democratic control  1.54 (1.64)  3  4  0  
Chatacteristics  Mean (SD)  Oregon  Arkansas  Maine  
Administrative capacity  8.37 (0.17)  8.49  8.12  8.3  
Waivers  2.08 (1.44)  2  5  2  
Medicaid MCO penetration  62.19 (23.75)  83.4  84.5  70.5  
Purchaser coalition strength  0.82 (.77)  0  1  2  
Right wing network strength  0.34 (.22)  0.13  0.50  0.29  
FMAP  59.41 (7.97)  62.91  70.71  63.27  
Health system ranking  25.92 (15.04)  32  48  5  
 
Second, we included a variable to evaluate the role of administrative capacity. Using data from the Book of the 
States, we identified the average value of earnings of state and local employees (excluding employees of state 
education systems) in each state in the year the SIM was announced (Council of State Governments 2012). We 
then took the natural log of these dollar figures. Consistent with the findings in the empirical literature, we 
expect state administrative capacity to be positively associated with state participation in the SIM initiative. 
Third, we constructed two variables to tap into the policy-legacies hypothesis: 
• Waivers: Drawing on Callaghan and Jacobs (2014), we included a count of the number of Section 1115 
waivers each state had requested prior to and during the grant period (CMS 2017). In total, states 
requested 104 waivers, ranging from zero requests from South Dakota and Nebraska to five requests 
from states like Arkansas and Michigan. Since these waivers help to build up state-level expertise with 
federal intergovernmental grant programs, we expect this variable to have a positive association with 
participation in the SIM initiative. 
• Medicaid Managed Care Organization (MCO) Penetration. Our qualitative analysis of applications for 
SIM funds suggested that state officials saw pre-existing Medicaid payment and contracting policies as 
important levers to “foster transformation to accountable care models” (RTI 2014, 3–29). Thus, we 
included a continuous variable measuring the percent of state Medicaid enrollees covered by a 
managed-care plan in 2010 (Gifford et al. 2011). We expect to see a positive relationship between MCO 
penetration and state participation in SIM. 
 
To assess the role of interest-group mobilization in shaping state decisions to apply for funds under SIM, we 
included two variables: 
• Purchaser Coalition Strength: Preliminary qualitative research suggested that, at least in some states, 
larger purchaser coalitions—such as the Pacific Business Group on Health and the Maine Health 
Management Coalition—played an important role in stimulating state participation in SIM. Indeed, early 
evaluation reports from SIM suggested that governors and state officials saw purchasers as key sources 
of support for the development of delivery-system innovations such as primary care medical homes (RTI 
2014, 20–22). Drawing on data from the National Alliance of Health Care Purchaser Coalitions (NAHCPC) 
and ProPublica’s Nonprofit Explorer Tool, we created an ordinal variable indicating the strength of the 
purchaser coalition in each of the fifty states at the beginning of the period of SIM implementation. The 
variable takes the value of 0 if the state contained no members of the NAHCPC in 2012. It takes the 
value of 1 if at the state contained at least one NAHCPC in the state in 2012. It takes the value of 2 at 
least one major purchaser coalition had annual revenue exceeding $1 million dollars in Fiscal Year 2012. 
We expect purchaser coalition strength to be positively associated with state participation in SIM. 
• Right-Wing Network Strength: We also included an index of the strength of right-wing network 
organizations, as described in Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, and Lynch (2016).2 This index is a continuous 
variable that captures the state-level capacity of four conservative organizations: the American 
Legislative Exchange Council, Americans for Prosperity, the Foundation for Government Accountability, 
and the State Policy Network. We expect to observe a negative relationship between right-wing network 
strength and state participation in SIM. 
 
Our model includes two control variables to account for economic context and the quality of state health 
systems. We used states’ FY 2012 Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentages (FMAP), the formula that 
determines the federal share of Medicaid financing, as a proxy for state economic characteristics. The formula 
that computes state FMAPs is based on the relationship between a state’s per capita income and national per 
capita income; states with lower per capita incomes relative to national per capita income have higher FMAPs. 
State FMAPs ranged from 50 percent (e.g., Illinois, Minnesota) to 74.18 percent (Mississippi). To examine state 
health-system quality, we employed an index of statewide health system performance published by 
the Commonwealth Fund (2009) to measure statewide health system performance. Background interviews and 
research suggested that states were attentive to their own ranking on this index in the process of deciding 
whether and how to engage in the SIM initiative. Here we include a measure of a state’s rank on the index. A 
lower rank (e.g., 1) equals higher performance on the index. For example, Vermont’s superior health system 
performance across a variety of categories made it the lowest rank state on the 2009 index, whereas 
Mississippi’s poor performance made it the highest. Summary statistics on the entire dataset as well as the case-
study states are presented in table 1. 
We supplemented the quantitative analysis with case studies of state participation in the SIM program. Our 
cases included three states (Arkansas, Maine, and Oregon) who received grants to test innovation models during 
the first year of the program. To receive a first round test grant, a state was required to have a State Innovation 
Plan in place—an indicator that a given state was willing and able to take a leading role in policy innovation and 
reform. Arkansas, Maine, and Oregon represent three of the six states that were selected to receive first round 
test grants. We selected these three states to capture variation in the level of participation in other, more visible 
ACA components. Oregon both expanded Medicaid under the ACA and setup its own state-based 
exchange.3 Arkansas relies on a federal IT platform to run its state-based health exchange and applied for a 
waiver to allow for a so-called “private Medicaid option,” in which the newly eligible Medicaid population gains 
coverage through the purchase of subsidized healthcare in the state's healthcare exchange. Maine chose not to 
construct its own health insurance exchange, defaulting to the federal exchange, and declined to expand 
Medicaid.3 By selecting states that varied with respect to healthcare exchanges and Medicaid expansion, we 
hoped to learn whether decisions about these more visible aspects of the ACA affected either decisions and/or 
publicity around SIM participation. In addition, by focusing on these three states, we hope to uncover factors 
that influenced state-level decisions to participation in health policy innovation, but that may have been 
overlooked in prior ACA studies that focused solely on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and health insurance 
exchanges. Given the effort with quantitative data to explain variation in participating and not participation 
states, case selection for the qualitative interviews was not designed to capture non-participating states. 
Instead, we hoped to learn more about the states most ready to apply for test grants to learn what might set 
them apart from states that either entered at the design grant level, the pre-design level, or chose not to 
participate. 
To develop each case study, we reviewed published evaluation reports of state participation in SIM and 
conducted semi-structured interviews with four key informants in Arkansas, Maine, and Oregon, each of whom 
had been involved either in the development of their state’s plan, its implementation, or both. These interviews 
focused on factors affecting states’ decisions to participate in the SIM initiative, governance structures in each 
state to implement proposed reforms, details of state innovation plans, and successes and roadblocks in the 
implementation of the proposed reforms. 
Results 
State participation in the SIM initiative varied greatly. Overall, as the map in figure 1 shows, across both rounds 
of the SIM initiative, seventeen states participated only in the model-design phase (shown in gray). Eighteen 
states, shown in black, participated in the model testing phase (eight of these states also participated in the 
model design phase). Fifteen states (shown in white) did not participate in the SIM initiative.4 
Figure 1 
 
State participation in SIM initiative. 
Note: CT, IA, ID, MI, OH, RI, DE, TN participated in both model design and testing. 
 
Our multivariate models estimate how Democratic control of state government, state administrative capacity, 
state policy legacies (Waivers, Medicaid MCO Penetration), and interest-group capacity (Purchaser Coalition 
Strength; Right Wing Network Strength) affected state participation in the SIM initiative, controlling for states’ 
economic and health-system characteristics (FMAP, Health System Ranking). We use logistic regression because 
our dependent variable is a binary measure of state participation in the program. Table 2 presents the results of 
a full model, as well as two reduced models which exclude one of our two measures of state policy legacies. The 
findings here are robust to multiple model specifications (see Supplementary Appendix table A1). To interpret 
the results, table 3 presents marginal effects for statistically significant variables in Model 1. For all continuous 
variables, we calculated marginal effects by shifting variables one standard deviation above the mean. For the 
party control variable, marginal effects were calculated by shifting the variable from its median value to its third 
quartile value. All other variables were held constant at their mean values, or in the case of Democratic Control 
and Purchaser Coalition Strength, their median values. 
Table 2. Logistic regression analysis of state participation in SIM initiative 
Characteristics  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Democratic control  1.07 (.51)*  1.34 (.59)*  0.80 (.39)*  
Administrative capacity  12.12 (5.99)**  13.62 (5.85)*  11.78 (5.09)*  
Waivers  0.53 (.47)  –  0.70 (.42)+  
Medicaid MCO penetration  0.05 (.03)*  0.06 (.03)*  –  
Characteristics  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Purchaser coalition strength  0.46 (.89)  0.67 (.89)  0.75 (.85)  
Right wing network strength  –0.97 (2.82)  –0.57 (2.66)  –0.13 (2.4)  
FMAP  0.13 (.10)  0.11 (.10)  0.22 (.10)  
Health system ranking  –0.07 (.05)  –0.07 (.04)  –0.08 (.04)  
Pseudo R2  0.57  0.54  0.50  
Correctly predicted (%)  86  90  88  
N  50  50  50  
Note: Cell entries are coefficients from logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses. 
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, + p <0.10. 
 
Table 3. Marginal effects for statistically significant variables in Model 1 
Characteristics  Change in variable (from→to)  Change in predicted probability of SIM 
participation (%)  
Democratic control  1→3  +12.58  
Administrative capacity  8.37→8.54  +12.47  
Medicaid MCO penetration  62.19→85.94  +9.83  
Notes: For all continuous variables, marginal effects were calculated by shifting variables one standard 
deviation above the mean. For the party control variable, marginal effects were calculated by shifting the 
variable from its median value to its third quartile. All other variables were held constant at their mean values, 
or in the case of the Democratic Control and Purchaser Coalition strength variables, their median value. 
 
Across all three models, Democratic Control of government is positively and significantly associated with state 
participation in SIM (p < 0.05). As table 3shows, holding all other variables constant, a shift in Democratic control 
from one chamber of the state legislature to control of the governorship and at least one house of the 
legislature results in a 12.58 percent increase in the predicted probability of a state participating in the SIM 
initiative. 
Administrative Capacity was positively and significantly correlated with state participation in SIM (p < 0.01 in 
Model 1; p < 0.05 in Models 2 and 3). Holding all other variables constant, a shift the administrative capacity 
variable from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with a 12.47 percent increase in 
the predicted probability of SIM participation. 
As the results in Models 1 and 2 suggest, Medicaid MCO Penetration was positively and significantly associated 
with SIM participation (p < 0.05). The probability of state participation in SIM increases by 9.83 percent when 
MCO penetration is shifted from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean. While the coefficient for 
the Waivers variable is in the expected direction, its statistical significance (p < 0.1 in Model 3) disappears in the 
full model. The coefficients for Purchaser Coalition Strength and Right Wing Network Strength variables are in 
the expected direction but lack statistical significance. 
The results here suggest that while partisanship certainly affected states’ participation in the SIM initiative, its 
influence was muted when compared to other reforms with in the ACA, such as state adoptions of Medicaid 
expansion or insurance exchanges. Indeed, in states with high levels of administrative capacity and rates of MCO 
penetration, the effect of partisan control of state government is muted. In other words, while we may be 
seeing partisan “spillover” effects related to state Republican leaders’ opposition to “Obamacare,” partisanship 
is only part of the story. Indeed, state administrative capacity and policy legacies also appeared to play 
important roles here. To investigate how these factors, and others not captured by our models, affected state 
SIM participation, we turn next to evidence from case studies in three states (Arkansas, Oregon, and Maine) 
whose participation in SIM is correctly predicted by the quantitative model. 
Arkansas: Payers and Partnerships 
At the time of the passage of the ACA, Governor Mike Beebe, a Democrat, had been serving in Arkansas for 
three years. At the same time, the state voted for the Republican presidential candidates over Barack Obama by 
just shy of a 20 percent margin in 2008 and a 23 percent margin in 2012. Arkansas further defined itself as a 
purple state by electing not to expand its Medicaid program under the ACA, but to apply for a waiver from the 
federal government to use federal dollars that would have gone to a Medicaid expansion to pay for subsidies 
that would allow those who would have been eligible under a Medicaid expansion to purchase health insurance 
in Arkansas’s state health insurance exchange. While this plan for engaging with the ACA generated controversy 
in Arkansas, the plan remains in place even with the state’s subsequent governor, Asa Hutchinson. 
The fact that Arkansas had a governor who was a Democrat at the time of the ACA’s passage and subsequent 
Supreme Court decision upholding most of the Act clearly shaped the state’s decisions. At the same time, a 
coalition of actors in the state had already come together to address both issues of cost and quality in the state. 
First, in 2011, Governor Beebe approached the director of the state’s Medicaid program to try to come up with a 
plan to address the program’s unsustainable growth rate (Arkansas 2017). The state turned to the Arkansas 
Center for Health Improvement (ACHI) based at the University of Arkansas Medical School to act as a convener 
for stakeholders to discuss plans to improve healthcare outcomes in the state while stabilizing costs. 
Stakeholders included the state’s three larger payers—Medicaid, BlueCross/Blue Shield, and QualChoice as well 
as several provider networks. While initial conversations focused on prospective bundled payments, 
stakeholders ultimately decided to devise a payment reform around retrospective payment reconciliation. 
In 2012, stakeholders in Arkansas had already agreed to use an “episodes of care” mechanism as its approach to 
retrospective payment reconciliation. This involved stakeholders agreeing on a set of performance standards for 
a given diagnosis, evaluating the range of costs associated with care for that diagnosis for a given time period 
(usually a year), and penalizing or rewarding providers depending on how costly their services were and the 
outcomes they produced.5 That same year, CMS selected Arkansas to be part of the Comprehensive Primary 
Care (CPC) Initiative, which enrolled providers in payment reform efforts geared towards producing better 
health outcomes with more efficient uses of resources. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
issued a request-for-proposals in August 2012 and Arkansas applied using its episodes of care payment reform 
and adding two additional components: (1) a patient centered medical home component geared towards 
preventing and treating chronic conditions and (2) a health home component designed for patients with special 
needs including the frail elderly and patients with disabilities. CMS awarded Arkansas a State Innovation Model 
award in 2013, allowing the state to expand its efforts with respect to episodes of care and launch a patient 
centered medical home reform in the state. 
Up until the receipt of the CPC and the SIM awards in 2012 and 2013, the Arkansas Center for Health 
Improvement had not received any federal support and relied, instead, on foundations to support its work. Once 
the state received the CPC and SIM awards, a key informant recounted, “That kicked everything into high gear. 
We would not have gone as far without that money” (Arkansas 2017). The decision to apply for a SIM grant was 
made when the Arkansas Department of Human Services and State Medicaid directors along with the state’s 
Surgeon General approached the governor to suggest applying for a SIM grant. Because Arkansas was already 
working hard to implement its own payment reform efforts, the decision to apply for a SIM award was “pretty 
much a no-brainer” (Arkansas 2017). Arkansas Surgeon General, Joseph Thompson, was heading the ACHI, 
which was already working with the three primary payers in the state—Medicaid, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, and 
QualChoice on episodes of care. That the Surgeon General was arguing for applying indicated that these major 
players supported the idea of federal support. Further, while healthcare provider organizations wanted to be 
involved in major policy deliberations, they did not ultimately oppose the decision to apply for a SIM grant 
(Arkansas 2017). In conversations led by ACHI with stakeholders about how to address healthcare costs, 
stakeholders discussed several options: (1) cut reimbursement rates; (2) limit services; (3) move to a managed 
care approach; or (4) pay providers using fee-for-services with the new episodes of care approach, the 
stakeholders agreed that the fourth option was the most palatable. 
When state officials found out Arkansas had been one of six states or regions to receive a SIM grant, they 
publicized the award widely. The mechanism itself received far less media attention that the state’s Medicaid 
expansion waiver, so it appears that the award was publicized primarily with providers, payers, and state 
legislators. Actors involved in the payment reform effort said that people in the state associated the state’s 
insurance exchange and Medicaid expansion with the ACA, but not the episodes of care reform nor the patient 
centered medical home reform. At the same time, those implementing the reform effort report that they used 
the award to raise their profile among stakeholders in order to try to get both more payers and more providers 
to participate (Arkansas 2017). 
The first two efforts outlined in the SIM grant for Arkansas can boast a number of successes in that the PCMH 
and episodes of care reforms have both produced costs savings and have attracted broad participation from 
payers and providers. Several factors seem to have affected Arkansas’s experience. First, there are a small 
number of major payers and, according to a key informant, the people who lead these organizations are familiar 
with one another and have common interests in improving healthcare outcomes in the state and controlling 
costs. Once the big three players were at the table, providers had an incentive to join the effort as well. ACHI 
also led efforts to pass legislation that would support payment reform efforts by requiring every clinic in the 
state to pay a fee to support the Patient-Centered Medical Home effort. One difficulty state implementers 
encountered in trying to add more payers was an assumption on the part of smaller-scale payers that, as long as 
the big three were demanding improvements in quality, providers would deliver those quality improvements to 
all of the patients in their panels, regardless of payer. This created a free-rider problem that the implementers 
countered with moral arguments about participation being “the right thing to do” (Arkansas 2017). 
The Health Homes initiative, however, was blocked by nursing homes associations. Those involved with the 
program argue that without the private payers (Blue Cross/Blue Shield and QualChoice) pushing for the reforms 
legislators were more subject to lobbying on the part of providers. The state has now pivoted to an accountable 
care organization approach for patients with special needs who were originally the target for health homes. 
The change in governorship does not appear to have changed the state’s or its stakeholders’ commitment to the 
SIM project. Factors that might explain the state’s engagement in the SIM project include the small number of 
payers who were already in conversations about how to control costs, a governance structure that brought 
together both public and private sector payers, and a limited set of options for covering rising healthcare costs 
in the state. Key informants also suggest that the poor health outcomes data in Arkansas were a motivating 
factor (Arkansas 2017). However, it was not clear whether Arkansas’s lower marks on health outcomes relative 
to the national averages created a general sense of urgency to improve care quality or whether poor health 
outcomes provided explicit or implicit leverage in bringing providers to the table. Certainly, with the health 
outcomes data widely known, it would be hard for providers to argue that the payers were getting good value 
for their money. Discussions with a key informant in Arkansas gave the impression that engagement with SIM 
was conducted at the level of interest group politics with the mobilized interests being primarily payers and 
providers (Arkansas 2017). Mobilized groups met through the ACHI and tended to involve legislators only at the 
outset when they were unsure of their inclusion in decision making. Implementers were proud of receiving the 
SIM grant and were vocal about receiving the grant and framing the award as evidence of Arkansas’s role as a 
policy leader in payment and delivery reform. 
Maine: Government-Led Reform in an anti-Obamacare State 
The politics surrounding ACA implementation in Maine look very much like those seen on the national level. 
Maine has experienced strong and persistent divisions between Republicans and Democrats on issues of 
Medicaid expansion and the construction of a state-based exchange. Maine’s Republican governor, Paul LePage, 
supported by local Tea Party activists, opposed both the Medicaid expansion and the establishment of a state-
based insurance exchange. Democrats in the Maine legislature, on the other hand, have passed legislation to 
expand Medicaid on five different occasions. In vetoing a Medicaid expansion bill in 2014, LePage echoed the 
Republican rhetoric that has emanated from state houses in non-expansion states across the U.S. Governor 
LePage described the expansion’s promised savings as mere “mirages,” adding that the budgetary consequences 
would be “disastrous” and the expansion “ruinous” for Maine (LePage 2014; Moretto 2014a). Unlike Republican 
governors in Arizona, Ohio, and Nevada, who expanded Medicaid as a means of securing budget relief and 
boosting the state economy, LePage was not swayed by the ACA’s promise of federal Medicaid dollars. Even 
after Maine voters approved a ballot measure in November 2017 to expand Medicaid, LePage vowed to reject 
any proposal that relied on higher taxes or surplus revenues to pay Maine’s share of the expansion.6 
With few exceptions, the Republican members of Maine’s legislature have supported Governor LePage’s anti-
ACA policy decisions, making it impossible for Democrats to override the governor’s multiple vetoes.7 This 
opposition has remained despite policy concessions to address common Republican critiques and concerns 
regarding the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. The Medicaid expansion proposed by state legislators in 2015, for 
example, included a requirement that the legislature reauthorize the expansion when federal funding for the 
expansion population dropped below 100 percent of costs. The 2015 iteration also included an automatic opt-
out if federal funding ever dropped below promised levels (Lawlor 2015; Moretto 2014b; Cousins and Shepherd 
2016). This provision was a direct response to opposition that was premised on the fear that the federal 
government would not live up to its promise, resulting in a massive financial burden being thrust onto state 
budgets. Maine’s expansion legislation also contained a provision to move the entire MaineCare population into 
private managed care plans. Demonstrating the depth of partisan divisions, this most recent legislative attempt 
to expand Medicaid in Maine—an attempt that included the reauthorization provision, the automatic opt-out, 
and the managed care provisions—was still pronounced “dead on arrival” by Republican opponents (Lawlor 
2015). 
Having not yet expanded Medicaid or established a state-based exchange, Maine is very much the outlier in the 
Northeastern United States. Despite Republican governors in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Maine is the only 
state in the Northeast that has not yet implemented the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. In addition, Maine is the 
only state in New England not to establish a state-based exchange. Following the failure of Republicans to repeal 
and replace the ACA in 2017, Governor LePage stated his intention to “withdraw the state and just go do our 
own thing” (Thistle 2017). Evidence from other, less visible, parts of the ACA, however, suggest that Maine has 
neither withdrawn itself from federal health policy, in general, nor the ACA, in particular. In 2012, Maine was 
awarded a round 1 SIM test grant for just over $33,000,000. In financial terms, this grant represents a 
considerably smaller investment in the ACA compared to an expansion of Medicaid, but as one of just six states 
to receive such a grant, Maine assumed the position of a policy leader in this realm of ACA-related reforms. 
The impetus to apply for the SIM award came from the state’s Health Commissioner and leaders in MaineCare, 
the state’s Medicaid program. According to a key informant, the Governor’s office supported the application 
once the State Health Commissioner argued that reform efforts that were, at the time, only a “gleam in people’s 
eyes” could be tested with a SIM award (Maine 2017). SIM was also flexible, allowing states to develop their 
own reform plans instead of CMS instructing them to implement a prescriptive reform model. While the ability 
to design reforms that were particularly suited to Maine was attractive to state officials, Maine’s SIM application 
touted the potential for replicating Maine’s reforms and innovations in other states. Maine’s public health 
officials were, therefore, positioning Maine to be a leader and model for ACA-related policy innovations. 
In its SIM application, Maine described itself as an “incubator” for federal pilots and demonstrations, prefacing 
its innovation plan and test grant application on the existence of a strong foundation of existing health reform 
initiatives. In 2012, at the time Maine filed its SIM application, there were at least nine ongoing CMS/ACA-
funded demonstrations or pilots operating in the state. One product of this legacy of reform is the creation of a 
“collaborative culture” and a supportive “environment for change” (Maine DHHS 2012a, 26). This environment 
of change and collaboration spans the public–private divide, and includes leadership and participation from a 
broad spectrum of payers and providers. The tradition of public–private partnerships has left Maine with what 
has been described as an “improvement overload” (Maine DHHS 2012b, 18). The challenge created by this 
“improvement overload” is one of coordination—the need to establish an organizational framework and 
cohesive strategy for reform. Maine’s health policy leadership envisioned the SIM grant as not only a way to 
build and implement new reforms, but also as a mechanisms for coordinating existing reform efforts and 
allowing Maine to achieve more from their ongoing reform efforts (Maine DHHS 2012a, 26–27). The SIM grant 
was, therefore, an effort to deepen the impact of federal-state partnerships in Maine and ensure successful and 
sustainable reform initiatives (Maine DHHS 2012a, 27). 
The governance of the test model in Maine was led by two separate bodies: the SIM Core team and the SIM 
Steering Committee. Members of the SIM Core come entirely from state agencies including the Health 
Commissioner’s Office, MaineCare, and the state’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Although these 
actors consulted with stakeholders about the goals for the SIM grant in advance of applying, the SIM Steering 
Committee, the body that included private sector representatives, was not convened until after the state 
received the federal award. Included in this group is the Maine Healthcare Management Coalition, a purchaser-
led convener of employers, providers, payers and patients. Also on the steering committee are citizen 
representatives, HealthInfoNet, the state's health information exchange, and Maine Quality Counts, an 
independent group supporting patient-centered care. These private sector actors are joined on the Steering 
Committee by individuals from the public sector representing the state legislature, the Bureau of Insurance, 
MaineCare and the Maine CDC. In this respect, the governance of the Maine SIM appears to sit in between the 
state-run Oregon SIM model and the non-governmental AHCI. 
Maine’s test model has multiple components, but focuses on a few central goals. Two of its most important 
goals are to increase the role of primary care in managing patients’ care and to integrate both physical and 
behavioral health care. One of the primary mechanisms used to achieve these two goals is the creation of more 
centralized data platforms that allow providers across multiple sites of care to see the larger picture of care. 
According to a key informant, the test has been successful in a number of respects, including increased access 
for behavioral health providers to their patient’s medical records, which has improved care coordination and 
decreased over-prescribing (Maine 2017). The creation of behavioral health homes has focused on preventing 
diabetes in high risk populations and has shown a decrease in rates of diabetes. The effort to train healthcare 
leaders in how to transform delivery organizations to adopt team-based care was less successful in that the 
trainings were time consuming and attracted fewer participants than expected. The key informant interview did 
not uncover any stakeholder politics that stood in the way of Maine’s implementation of its test model (Maine 
2017). Moreover, stakeholders included in the implementation process selected several aspects of the test 
model to continue after the final year of the SIM award. 
Oregon: Building on a State Policy Legacy 
Oregon’s decision to apply for a SIM grant, especially given support for other elements of the ACA, is less 
surprising than it is for Arkansas or Maine. We include this case to examine the factors that drove state decisions 
on SIM in states with stronger Democratic control. In November 2010, Democrat and former two-term governor 
Dr John A. Kitzhaber was re-elected as the governor of Oregon, continuing the streak of Democrat governors 
since 1987. In his first two terms, Kitzhaber created the Oregon Health Plan (the state Medicaid health plan) as a 
state-run managed care plan and contributed to the increase of Medicaid enrollment by 50 percent (Goldsmith 
and Henderson 2017). Despite this initial early success, enrollment in the OHP eventually declined significantly 
(LeCouteur et al. 2004) and the recession resulted in rolling back benefits. When he was re-elected to a third 
term in 2010 after a hiatus, he once again made Medicaid healthcare reform a centerpiece of his administration. 
He spearheaded the creation of Coordinated Care Organizations (CCOs)—networks of providers, payers and 
community organizations that cover physical health care, mental health, addiction treatment, and often dental 
care—that reduce costs and integrate care all under one budget.8 During his administration, he experimented 
with Medicaid eligibility determination and “fast track enrollment” for individuals who qualified based on 
participation in other state-run programs. This helped increase enrollment and reduce uninsurance rates. He 
received overwhelming support on healthcare reform from the legislature through his terms. From 2009 to 
2011, Democrats were in control of the Oregon legislature. The 76th legislature of Oregon was nearly an even 
split between the two political parties, but they remained aligned on changes to the state Medicaid program 
(Klein, McCarthy, and Cohen 2014). A key informant during an interview said that “there was a recognition that 
the delivery system need[ed] to be changed” and “the legislation that placed CCOs in place was very bipartisan” 
(Oregon 2017). 
At the onset of the SIM grant application process, the Oregon legislature had already passed key legislation (HB 
2009) to transform state spending and delivery of care. Among other things, HB 2009 created the Oregon Health 
Authority to oversee state health programs, initiated the state's Patient-Centered Primary Care Home (PCPCH) 
program, and outlined a plan for an Oregon Health Insurance exchange. Further legislation in 2011 and 2012 
under the direction of Governor Kitzhaber led to the development of CCOs for implementation in Medicaid as 
cost-controlling measure and to allow for integrating care under one budget. In 2012, Oregon had also received 
approval for a Medicaid Section 1115 waiver bringing in $1.9 billion in return for a 2 percent reduction in per-
capita Medicaid spending by year two; and a Section 2703 waiver under the ACA to integrate care in Medicaid 
Health Homes. 
While the key pieces of Oregon’s innovation under the SIM grant were placed into action prior to the receipt of 
the grant, the federal funding stream of $45 million allowed the state to implement the Section 1115 waiver and 
the use of CCOs, and to launch the Transformation Center which provides technical assistance and coordination 
between the different stakeholders, private and public. One interviewee mentioned that the SIM grant allowed 
them to roll out the plans and legislation they had already planned to do, and hasten the pace of certain goals, 
such as rolling out aspects of CCOs to the public employee health benefits program. The interviewee stated that 
the funding “expanded key elements of the CCO’s to public employees… [including] quality incentives, aligning 
incentive measures and keeping cost growth down, transparency in performance, [and] engaging members in 
[their health] care” (Oregon 2017). The grant also led to the establishment of the Office of Equity Inclusion, and 
investment into public and private partnerships for housing supports. 
The SIM grant is covered by the state at the Oregon Health Authority, which was reorganized in 2015, following 
the election of Democrat Kate Brown as governor. The SIM grant is managed at the state-level, but the 
Transformation Center that supports the CCO’s facilitates interaction between different stakeholders, and also 
provides training for clinicians to better implement the Triple Aim. Interviews demonstrated that the process of 
generating support for the CCOs came at the state level initially in terms of learning collaboratives, but soon the 
need lay in technical support. 
The public also seemed to be largely unaware of the federal financial support for CCO implementation and its 
ties to the ACA. Sixteen CCOs are currently operating in the state, and 90 percent of individuals are enrolled in 
one of them.9 Research shows that transformation into CCO’s led to a seven percent reduction in cost 
(McConnell et al. 2017). According to a key informant, the failures associated with Oregon’s state exchange 
drew public attention, while its SIM program did not, “frustration in Oregon came from our own health 
exchange” (Oregon 2017). The rollout of the state-based health insurance marketplace was marred by technical 
errors, leading the state to abandon their state website in 2014 for the federal exchange (Foden-Vencil 2014). 
Interviews with key stakeholders in Oregon suggest that some individuals may have enrolled in CCOs without 
much political antagonism perhaps in part due to the lack of association of these new models with the ACA. 
Like Arkansas, implementation of the SIM grant in Oregon seems to have moved quickly, largely because state 
leaders overcame legislative and planning hurdles prior to the state’s receipt of the funds. One interviewee 
suggested that reformers in Oregon were in conversation with federal officials involved in designing the SIM 
project such that reformers in Oregon could anticipate the potential influx of federal dollars to help with the 
state initiative (Oregon 2017). Indeed, the Oregon case illustrates that states may be more likely to take up 
intergovernmental policy innovations when stakeholders at the state level are already poised to leverage federal 
dollars to accomplish their goals. 
Discussion 
The results of our quantitative analysis suggest that a state’s participation in SIM is shaped by the partisan 
composition of state government, its prior policy investments in Medicaid managed care, and its administrative 
capacity. As in prior studies of ACA implementation, we found that states with Democratic-controlled 
legislatures and Democratic governors were more likely to participate in SIM. To some extent, the significance of 
the partisan variable in our quantitative model casts doubt on the notion that small-scale, low-salience grant 
programs will generate intergovernmental cooperation, rather than conflict (Gormley 2006). When compared to 
other intergovernmental components of the ACA such as the Medicaid expansion, insurance exchanges, and 
regulatory reforms, the SIM initiative imposed few restrictions or requirements on states and was virtually 
invisible to mobilized opponents of the ACA. Instead, it offered states opportunities to finance payment and 
delivery reforms that reflected existing private-sector trends. Nevertheless, states with stronger Republican 
control were significantly less likely to participate in SIM. Thus one implication of our study is that partisan 
polarization may impose barriers to intergovernmental cooperation, even when federal programs are designed 
to enable credit claiming by state-level officials. 
Nevertheless, partisanship appears to play a smaller role in shaping participation in SIM than it does in other 
areas of ACA implementation, such as the creation of insurance exchanges or Medicaid expansion. Regardless of 
partisanship, states with high levels of administrative capacity and a legacy of policy investments in Medicaid 
managed care were more likely to participate in SIM. Additionally, the quantitative model suggests that interest-
group opposition to the ACA appears not to have had an impact on SIM participation. Interviews in the 
Republican-dominated states revealed that there was no effort on the part of those implementing SIM reforms 
to keep the award beneath the radar. In fact, the reverse is true in that actors in Arkansas and Maine used the 
award to portray themselves as leaders in health policy reform with respect to other states. This is perhaps 
especially surprising in Maine where a conservative governor had publicly rejected engagement with the ACA. 
Instead of trying to reconcile that position with applying for and receiving the SIM award, it appears that the 
Governor’s office never even felt the need to address the inconsistency. While one might have guessed that 
there was political cover for the SIM application given the presence of the Maine Healthcare Management 
Coalition, it does not appear that anyone pressed the supportive coalition into service on this point. Key 
informants from Oregon point out that they publicized their program and indicated that they are a frequent 
source of information for other states looking to learn from Oregon’s experience. The visibility Oregon 
generated around its program, however, matches its willingness to engage with other components of the ACA. 
Thus, while policy cannot be easily engineered to reverse partisan opposition to intergovernmental reforms, the 
SIM case illustrates that pre-existing policy legacies or administrative capacity may make it easier for states to 
participate in intergovernmental policy innovation. Key informants in Oregon and Arkansas indicated that 
reform efforts were planned out before SIM, but that the federal money increased either their legitimacy in 
pursuing reforms, expanded the scope of what they were able to accomplish, or both. These informants gave 
the impression that federal officials knew about existing reform efforts and used the funding to improve the 
chances that these states had the resources and legitimacy to move their existing reform efforts forward. Thus, 
those who designed the program may have been consciously trying to leverage the reforms in innovative states 
to encourage others to follow suit. 
In addition, key informants indicated that CMMI provided technical assistance to help states implement their 
reform efforts and created opportunities for learning across the states implementing Round 1 model grants. The 
structure of the SIM initiative appears to be designed so that the lessons from the lead states can be used both 
to encourage broader participation from other states and to inform those efforts. At the same time, it is possible 
that this mechanism might have encouraged states that had no reforms underway to try out new reform efforts 
in the state. While leaders of the SIM initiative in Maine had reform goals, the plans for how to achieve those 
goals were not articulated until the state and its partners sat down to write the grant application. This suggests 
that, even in Round 1, the SIM mechanism might have stimulated reform efforts rather than placing existing 
efforts on better footing. 
There are limits to our findings. First, our quantitative analysis does not differentiate between levels of state 
participation in the SIM initiative. Yet, national evaluations of SIM reveal variations in the depth and character of 
state implementation (e.g., Feder et al. 2017). Thus, it is quite possible that, were we to code state participation 
according to the intensity of investment of personnel, resources, and attention, the effect of our key variables 
may change. Additionally, because our quantitative analysis is cross-sectional, we do not have the ability to 
evaluate why states participation may have fluctuated over time. For instance, we cannot say why a state may 
have participated in the initiative at time T but dropped out at time T + 1. 
As the qualitative case studies reveal, there are clearly variables that affected state participation—including 
stakeholder participation and the concentration or dispersion of payers and providers in each state—but are not 
captured in logistic regression model. Using data to capture stakeholder participation or market power among 
payers and providers could allow us to add this factor to the quantitative model to shed light on how market 
structure might shape reform opportunities. 
Finally, the qualitative interviews do not include data from states that decided not to apply for a SIM grant or 
states that applied and dropped out. Instead, the qualitative interviews focused on a set of states that applied 
for and received test grants in Round 1. The article sheds light on what might be different about these states 
that would explain their status as early test grant recipients and explores what factors shaped their decision to 
apply. Future research on states that did not submit applications in either round could shed additional light on 
whether factors other than those captured in the quantitative model (capacity, partisanship, policy legacy, etc.) 
explain SIM participation. This would be especially relevant for non-participating states that our quantitative 
model predicted would have applied for SIM grants (FL, IN, MO, and NC). Equally, interviews with participating 
states that our model predicted would not participate (NH, OK, TX) could shed light on the factors that led these 
states to be outliers in the other direction. Our case studies are not illuminating on why Republican-dominated 
states that applied for and received Round 1 SIM grants experienced no partisan pushback for this engagement. 
One way to interpret this is that while payment and delivery reform is intensely political among the organized 
interests with a stake in outcomes, the nature of politicization is more pragmatic than partisan. Interest groups 
that have a business interest in SIM grants appear to press for a seat at the table and do not try to animate 
larger partisan politics or mobilize voters to undermine these reform efforts. 
Conclusion 
As of early 2018, the fate of the ACA at the national level remains unclear. Republicans in Congress failed to pass 
comprehensive legislation to repeal and replace the law, and only succeeded in eliminating the law’s individual 
coverage mandate by attaching it to a significant tax cut. Yet the ACA’s intergovernmental structure guarantees 
that important debates about the future of health reform will occur outside Washington, DC. Following 
Congress’s repeal of the individual mandate, proposals for new, more stringent mandates emerged in states like 
Connecticut and Maryland, where support for the ACA was strong. With encouragement from co-partisans at 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, states like Indiana, Kentucky, and Arkansas pursued Medicaid 
waivers that imposed work requirements on beneficiaries, an effort which the Obama administration had 
rebuffed. 
From these examples, one might conclude that future intergovernmental conflicts over the ACA may well retain 
a partisan edge. The evidence in this paper confirms that partisan control of government shapes states’ 
decisions about even small-scale, low-salience components of the ACA like the SIM initiative. Nevertheless, our 
findings also offer important lessons about the limits of partisanship as an explanation of state participation in 
intergovernmental policy innovations. Regardless of partisan control, states were more likely to participate in 
SIM when they had a high level of administrative capacity and a strong legacy of managed-care reforms within 
the Medicaid program. Our qualitative findings reveal that even in states where partisan opposition to the ACA 
was strong, entrepreneurial bureaucrats advanced SIM initiatives by uniting diverse coalitions of payers and 
providers. In Arkansas, the state's three largest payers worked in concert to bring providers to the table to 
negotiate payment reforms. In Maine, SIM efforts were driven by the Health Commissioner and MaineCare 
administrators and aimed at increasing care coordination, integrating physical and behavioral health, and 
improving the state’s data platform. In Wisconsin, where state leaders opposed the creation of an insurance 
exchange and the expansion of Medicaid, the state’s Medicaid program used SIM funds to carry out a new 
program of care integration for medically complex children.10 
This study has important implications for the future of health reform in the states. In the short term, an almost 
unprecedented level of partisan and interest-group conflict hampered intergovernmental collaboration on the 
ACA. As such, it seems likely that the SIM’s incremental, low-salience character helped to insulate it from the 
kind of friction that met the Medicaid expansion and the implementation of insurance exchanges. Moreover, 
states’ participation depended on more than the ACA’s mix of “carrots and sticks.” Especially when partisan 
opposition to the ACA was strong, what mattered was SIM’s alignment with states’ pre-existing policy 
commitments and the availability of a talented administrative core. To be sure, evidence about SIM’s design and 
implementation hardly provides a “magic formula” for generating intergovernmental collaboration, which is 
necessarily contingent and context-specific. Yet, if partisan conflict over “Obamacare” continues, policymakers 
and activists interested in intergovernmental collaboration—even for purely instrumental reasons if not for the 
sake of “cooperative federalism”—may have to reconsider the scale at which innovations are likely to occur; the 
need to strengthen policymaking capacity in states; and the value of aligning national program goals with states’ 
policy demands. Beyond specific knowledge about which policy interventions improve health outcomes, 
policymakers need a better understanding of how the federal system works, and how to stimulate 
intergovernmental collaboration in an age of polarization. 
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innovation plans 
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3 Minnesota, Vermont, and Massachusetts, which were the other three states to be awarded a first round test 
grant, followed Oregon in both expanding Medicaid and constructed a state-based health insurance 
exchange. 
4 This count, and our foregoing analysis, excludes the District of Columbia for purposes of comparability. The 
District of Columbia received a model design award only. 
5 During an episode of care, providers are paid on a fee-for-service basis, but are penalized after care is given if 
the provider exceeds acceptable spending levels. Providers who meet performance standards and 
whose average costs for an episode of care fall into the “commendable” range are eligible for 
gainsharing. 
6 At time of publication, Governor LePage has refused to implement the voter-approved Medicaid expansion 
and has announced a number of conditions that must be met by the legislature prior to any 
implementation. Among the conditions is that funding the Medicaid expansion cannot require increased 
taxes or the use of state’s budget stabilization fund and that Medicaid waitlists for the elderly and 
disabled be eliminated prior to funding the expansion (Cousins 2017). 
7 Two Republican Senators, Roger Katz and Thomas Saviello, have repeatedly joined Democrats in crafting and 
voting for Medicaid expansion legislation. 
8 For its description of its Coordinated Care Program, see the Oregon Health Authority 
website: http://www.oregon.gov/oha/HPA/Pages/CCOs-Oregon.aspx 
9 Oregon Health Authority’s report on its CCOs can be found 
here: http://www.oregon.gov/oha/HPA/ANALYTICS-MTX/Documents/HST%20Annual%20Report%20-
%202016.pdf. 
10 We did not interview individuals involved in Wisconsin’s SIM grant. Data on its program can be found at 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, Health Care Innovation Awards Round Two Project 
Profiles, July 2014, https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/HCIATwoPrjProCombined.pdf. 
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